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Abstract
Some cultural evolution researchers have argued for the importance of prestige bias
as a systematic and widespread social learning bias, that structures human social
learning and cultural transmission patterns. Broadly speaking, prestige bias accounts
understand it as a bias towards copying ‘prestigious’ individuals (which are typically
described as high-status, due to a high level of skill or success in a socially valued
domain, and so are treated by others with respect and deference). Prestige bias, along
with other social learning biases, has been argued to pay a crucial role in allowing
cumulative cultural selection to take place, thereby generating adaptations that are
key to our success as a species. However, I argue for skepticism about the plausibility
and scope of a prestige bias account. I argue that although an account of prestige bias
seems plausible or compelling on their face, it is committed to a particular view of the
cognition underpinning the bias, and therefore to predictions regarding its flexibility
and context-sensitivity. Given this, current empirical evidence gives us reason to doubt
the explanatory value of a prestige bias account over a naive, goal-directed agent
account. Additionally, the way that prestige is defined in empirical work is in tension
with a general understanding of prestige, casting doubt upon its status as evidence of
prestige bias. I examine two studies cited as evidence of prestige bias, arguing that in
these cases we cannot clearly favour a prestige bias explanation over a goal-directed
agent explanation.
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1 Introduction
Universal, or near-universal, social learning biases have been argued to be crucial in
understanding how cultures evolve. According to the work of authors such as Robert
Boyd, Peter Richerson, Joseph and Natalie Henrich, and Richard McElreath, there
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are various kinds of systematic cognitive biases that structure human social learning
and therefore the transmission of behaviours, ideas, and other components of culture
between individuals. This can affect patterns of cultural change and stasis on a popula-
tion level, and have been proposed as key drivers of the cumulative cultural evolution
that has enabled humans to thrive in a vast range of environments (Henrich 2015).
Broadly, these biases are often understood as ‘rules of thumb’ regarding who to
learn from, or what is learnt, which have evolved because of the high cost of individual
learning (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Boyd et al. 2011; Henrich et al. 2008; Henrich and
McElreath 2003). Models have been constructed that indicate that facultative social
learning emerges as a dominant strategy when individual learning is costly, and social
learning is cheap and accurate enough (Rendell et al. 2010). According to theoretical
models, social learning biases can increase the benefits of social learning (Henrich and
Boyd 1998, 2002). They do this by directing which variants are acquired or who the
variants are acquired from, and thereby increasing the likelihood that the new cultural
variant acquired will be adaptive for the learner.
Social learning biases are typically partitioned into three categories: content biases,
frequency-dependent biases, and model biases (Boyd and Richerson 1985). Content
biases (or direct biases) are those that favour the acquisition of one cultural variant
(which could be a behaviour, idea, practice, or norm, amongst other things) over
another by an individual because of characteristics of the variant itself (its content).
Work done by Dan Sperber and colleagues on the existence of ‘cultural attractors’
can be said to fall within the category of content biases (Sperber 1996), although their
understanding of what these biases constitute and how acquisition and transmission
operates differs from work carried out by Boyd, Richerson and Henrich, and their
students, who tend to focus on frequency-dependent and model biases.
Frequency-dependent biases, such as conformist or anti-conformist bias, are those
that favour the acquisition of one cultural variant over another due to characteristics of
the trait’s distribution in the population. The type of frequency-dependent bias that has
received the most attention in the literature is conformist bias, where individuals are
disproportionately more likely to copy variants that are present at a high frequency in
the population (Henrich and Boyd 1998; Efferson et al. 2008). Models of conformist
bias have claimed to explain a range of cultural phenomena, such as the diffusion of
innovations (Henrich 2001).
Lastly, model biases are those that favour the acquisition of one cultural variant
over another due to characteristics of the individual from whom the variant is acquired
(the ‘model’). The type of model bias that has received the most attention and has
been proposed as a key factor in cumulative cultural evolution, and is the focus of
this paper, is prestige bias. This is where learners are more likely to copy variants
from ‘prestigious’ individuals. Other model biases include a bias towards copying
individuals based on age, familiarity, or similarity to the learner in respects such as
gender or ethnicity.
These social learning biases also play an important role in the cultural selection
literature. The kinds of social learning biases already described often form the foun-
dation of approaches that focus on cultural selection as a key force for understanding
cumulative cultural change. For some authors, it is the set of universal social learning
biases (conformist bias, prestige bias, etc.) that has allowed cumulative cultural selec-
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tion to take place, and therefore brought about adaptations that are key to our success
as a species (e.g., Richerson and Boyd 2005). For example, conformist bias and pres-
tige bias have been cited as important factors in minimising levels of within-group
variation and maintaining levels of between-group variation, which are necessary for
cultural group selection to take place (Henrich 2004).
Another key example comes from Henrich (2015), who argues that conformist
bias forms a crucial part of the explanation of why the series of steps carried out to
detoxify cassava emerged and spread throughout some South American populations.
Some varieties of cassava contain dangerous levels of cyanide, which if eaten without
being adequately processed to remove toxins, could result in chronic health problems,
such as goiter and neurological issues. Communities in South America which rely on
cassava as an important part of their diet have a multi-step processing technique that
occurs over several days and results in detoxified and safe to eat cassava. Henrich
argues that any one individual would have difficulty working out this technique by
themselves, and therefore individual learning fails to explain this adaptive behaviour.
This is because the poisoning is slow, and so it would be difficult to figure out the
connection between eating cassava and experiencing health issues. Additionally, the
cassava stops being bitter before it stops being toxic, and therefore individuals who are
relying on the signal of bitterness would continue to ingest unsafe levels of cyanide.
Here the steps in this procedure are “causally opaque”: individuals cannot easily infer
the functions or importance of the behaviours they are carrying out. Therefore, invoking
broad social learning biases could explain the spread of this adaptive behaviour when
explanations in terms of individual learning fail. This feeds into a selective process
because individuals who copy this behaviour will have fitness advantages over those
who do not, and groups whose members perform this behaviour will outcompete those
who do not.
However, some doubt has been cast on the existence or prevalence of these biases.
Lewens (2015) offers a critique of the conformist bias literature, arguing that some
of the key assumptions made in conformist bias models are not supported by empir-
ical evidence, and that there may be some circularity in the way that empirical and
theoretical evidence is used to construct explanations.
Similarly, I argue for skepticism about the existence and prevalence of prestige bias.
Broadly speaking, prestige bias can be understood as a bias towards copying ‘pres-
tigious’ individuals. What constitutes a prestigious individual is not always entirely
clear, and not fully elaborated on in the literature. Intuitively, prestigious individuals
are high-status (typically due to a high level of skill or success in a socially valued
domain), are treated by others with respect and deference, and may receive tangible
goods due to their status.
Theoretical models have purported to show the adaptive benefit of prestige bias.
Several studies have claimed to demonstrate the existence of prestige bias in both
children and adults, and to show prestige-biased transmission networks in small-scale
societies. As with conformist bias, prestige bias is an important component of cultural
selection explanations. For example, Henrich and Henrich’s (2010) work on food
taboos in Fiji characterises taboos surrounding eating certain marine species by preg-
nant and breastfeeding women as the result of prestige-biased learning. According to
Henrich and Henrich, prestige-biased learning results in the spread of these beneficial
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food taboos, leading to population-level patterns of adaptation. These social learning
biases can be culturally selected for in themselves, as if they generally lead to the
copying of adaptive behaviour, individuals who have them will outcompete individu-
als who do not. Additionally, groups with higher proportions of individuals copying
the adaptive behaviour will do better than groups who do not.
Prestige bias models have also been invoked as a tool for understanding the existence
of prestige in itself, and as explanations for a range of cultural phenomena, including
the existence of celebrities, and of so-called ‘prestige goods’, that advertise the status
of a prestigious individual (Henrich 2001; Plourde 2008; Mesoudi 2009).
I argue that although the accounts of prestige bias given by cultural evolution
researchers seem plausible or compelling on their face, they in fact entail a set of
commitments regarding the underlying cognition, how the bias operates, and how
we should understand prestige. Once we relax these commitments, the prestige bias
account loses explanatory value and struggles to offer anything distinctive over a
naive, goal-directed agent account. In the following section I begin by summarising
the main account of prestige bias developed in the literature (found in Henrich and
Gil-White 2001). In Sect. 3 I argue that the characterisation of prestige under pres-
tige bias accounts and in empirical tests of prestige bias is in tension with a general
understanding of prestige. The definition of prestige in empirical work is pruned in
a way which defers to the definition of prestige given by the prestige bias account,
and this calls into question the status of this work as evidence of prestige bias. Addi-
tionally, the prestige bias account is committed to a particular view of the cognition
underpinning the bias, and therefore to predictions regarding its flexibility and context-
sensitivity. Both these considerations give us reason to question the explanatory value
of a prestige bias account over a goal-directed agent account to explain patterns of
apparent prestige-biased learning. I then make this comparison with a goal-directed
agent account explicit in Sect. 4, drawing on two cases cited as evidence of prestige
bias to argue that they do not clearly favour a prestige bias account over a goal-directed
agent account.
2 An account of prestige bias
Henrich and Gil-White (2001) set out an extensive account of prestige bias. Although
other authors have proposed similar accounts (e.g., Richerson and Boyd 2005), in addi-
tion to being the most comprehensive and detailed account, theirs has been explicitly
cited and used as the basis for theoretical and empirical work (e.g., Bell 2013; Cheng
and Tracy 2014; Chudek et al. 2012; Reyes-Garcia et al. 2008; Atkisson et al. 2012).
Therefore, here I focus on their account.
They define prestige in contrast with dominance, and characterise it as unique to
human societies. According to Henrich and Gil-White, dominance hierarchies are typ-
ical of chimpanzee societies (which do not display prestige). In dominance hierarchies,
subordinates exhibit submissive behaviours towards superiors, avoid superiors when
possible, and occasionally make aggressive challenges to the rank ordering. Domi-
nant individuals in these hierarchies ‘grandstand’ to display their dominance, which
is maintained primarily through physical force, or threat of physical force. In contrast,
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in prestige hierarchies, subordinates will actively seek contact and interaction with
superiors, and will spend sustained periods observing superiors. Prestigious individ-
uals will not grandstand, and may even be self-deprecating and adopt non-dominant
postures such as looking down. Henrich and Gil-White claim that human hierarchies
are typically a mix of dominance and prestige.
The existence of prestige is supposedly puzzling on its face, in that individuals are
paying ‘costs’ in terms of deference and perhaps material goods towards prestigious
individuals, and therefore we would expect some kind of benefit for these individuals
in order for this behaviour to be evolutionarily stable. Henrich and Gil-White argue
for what they term the ‘information goods theory’. The key insight of this theory is
to propose ‘information goods’ as the goods that deference-paying individuals are
receiving, and which therefore stabilise prestige hierarchies in a population.
As they characterise it, prestige hierarchies will develop in populations with indi-
viduals that are already capable of ranking the relative skill of other members of the
population, and of displaying deference selectively to certain chosen members. There
are two key components to their story of the evolution of prestige bias: initially, indi-
viduals must have been able to determine the most adaptive models to copy from
relatively reliably, and would have paid deference to those models in order to gain
access so they could copy their behaviours. Once these two components are in place,
rather than carrying out a potentially complex calculation to work out who is the best
learning model, new entrants can use the low-cost cue of who is being paid the most
deference to in order to determine who they should copy: this is prestige bias.
Firstly, in order for prestige hierarchies to emerge, individuals will have had the
ability to rank potential learning models according to sets of cues. These cues include
the model’s perceived competence, their perceived health, and their similarity to the
learner in key respects such as age or gender (which may increase the likelihood
that the cultural variants the model holds will be adaptive for the learner to acquire).
Individuals that can pick up on these cues and successfully use them to selectively copy
from certain models in the population will stand to benefit, as they will be more able
to acquire adaptive cultural variants than through either individual learning (and at a
lower cost than through individual learning) or ‘unguided variation’ (copying members
of the population at random). In particular, individuals that can identify models with
high levels of skill or knowledge in a valued domain (in the ancestral environment,
this could have been hunting, foraging or knowledge of medicinal plants), and can
copy the behaviour of these models, will have an adaptive advantage.
Secondly, Henrich and Gil-White argue that in ancestral environments, copying the
behaviours of a chosen model requires perceptual access, and therefore requires the
cooperation of the model themselves. For example, if novice hunters wish to learn
from successful hunters, they would likely need to closely observe various behaviours
and practices that successful hunters use, in order to accurately copy them. If it is the
case that access to models is crucial, then successful or skilful individuals who many
learners wish to copy would be able to control access and thereby copying opportunities
(providing they cannot be coerced into supplying this information). Then, a system
could develop whereby individuals seeking to learn from successful individuals (who
it would be adaptive to copy from) pay them deference, accord them status, and provide
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material benefits (such as exceptions from certain restrictive community norms), in
return for access and the opportunity to observe their behaviours.
Eventually, in the population there will be a distribution of deference, where the
most successful or skilful individuals will have many learners paying them deference
(and therefore conferring ‘prestige’ upon them). When this happens, new individuals
who are deciding who to learn from can decide based upon the level of deference (i.e.,
identifying the most prestigious individuals), rather than making assessments of skill
or knowledge directly. This is supposedly adaptive because we would expect it to be
significantly easier in many cases to identify the most prestigious individuals, rather
than identifying them based on their skill or knowledge level. For example, who is
the best hunter may be difficult to determine quickly or simply, given that there can
be high levels of day-to-day variance in hunting returns, and even the best hunters
can go through sustained periods without successful large kills. Rather than waiting
to collect and compare data on hunting prowess, a novice hunter could simply use the
‘low-cost cue’ of who is the most prestigious hunter in the group (i.e., who is paid the
most deference, and observed the most, by others), in order to determine who to copy.
Henrich and Gil-White argue that this kind of scenario is typical in human history:
individuals who were able to pick up on deference or prestige cues and use them to
selectively copy models would have had an adaptive advantage within their group, and
therefore prestige bias would have been selected for.
Henrich and Gil-White describe the development of prestige bias as potentially
resulting in a kind of prestige ‘market’, arising from the differing interests of learners
and models. Learners are seeking to copy the most successful or skilful models, whilst
models have an interest in acquiring learners in order to receive deference benefits.
This may mean that there is competition, where models compete to attract learners.
If there is competition, models have an incentive to be ‘nicer’ in order to attract more
learners. They use this to explain supposed ‘subdominant ethology’ found in some
high-status individuals (such as self-deprecation, deep bows and lowered heads).
Although the details are not explicitly set out in the Henrich and Gil-White paper, it
is possible this was followed by gene-culture coevolution, whereby, once prestige bias
is prevalent and adaptive, genes that aid the reliable expression of prestige bias are
selected for and spread. Additionally, Henrich and Gil-White (and other prestige bias
accounts) do not dwell on the cognitive basis of these biases (for example, whether
they must be implicit and automatic, or whether they can be available to or the product
of conscious reflection).
3 Assessing prestige bias explanations
Although the evolutionary story that Henrich and Gil-White offer seems plausible on
its face, particularly when brought to life with examples of modern-day prestigious
individuals, when we dig deeper we see that in order for the prestige bias account
to have explanatory force, it entails a set of particular commitments, for which the
empirical evidence is mixed. Once we relax these commitments, it becomes difficult
to make the case for the explanatory power of prestige bias accounts over, for example,
a naive goal-directed agent explanation.
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I will highlight issues that fall into two broad themes: firstly, that empirical evidence
in support of prestige bias uses a concept of prestige that is pruned in deference to
prestige bias theory, in a way which casts doubt upon the extent to which this work
constitutes evidence in support of prestige bias, and secondly, that the prestige bias
account entails particular commitments regarding the cognitive basis of prestige bias,
and the extent to which it will be flexible and sensitive to context. Both these themes
have a direct impact on the comparison between a prestige bias account and a goal-
directed agent account. This comparison will be drawn explicitly in Sect. 4.
3.1 Characterising prestige
The first key problem with the prestige bias account concerns the vagueness regarding
how the concept of prestige is understood. Precisely what prestige is comprised of
is not fully characterised in Henrich and Gil-White’s account, or indeed in other
accounts of prestige bias. This is important to note, particularly when considering
the evidence from empirical studies which use various proxies for prestige. There
appears to be a disconnect between how prestige is understood within the Henrich
and Gil-White account, how prestige is understood in general usage, and how prestige
is operationalised in empirical work on prestige bias. In particular, the definition of
prestige used in empirical work is often pruned in deference to the prestige bias account
itself, calling into question the extent to which these studies can be used as evidence
of prestige bias.
Henrich and Gil-White give a tentative ‘ethology’ of prestige, where they describe
prestigious individuals as in control of the time spent with ‘subordinates’, having a
free posture without grandstanding or violent gestures, and appearing confident yet
self-deprecating. This is drawn in explicit contrast to dominance, where individuals
rely on aggression and threat of physical force to maintain their rank. However, this
is not comprehensive in that many individuals in a society may display these kinds
of behaviours, without being regarded as ‘prestigious’. By this I mean that there are
many individuals, at least in modern societies, that do not display either dominant
(aggressive) behaviours, or subordinate (threatened or submissive) behaviours. They
may project confidence in their interactions with others, and be in control of who
they spend their time with, and yet not enjoy the status benefits we typically associate
with prestige (and will not be named as prestigious by others). In fact, the observed
behaviours of prestigious people may not differ from less prestigious people in any
systematic way, other than that the behaviour of others may be modulated in the
presence of people they consider prestigious.
Additionally, it is unclear to what extent their use of the term ‘prestigious’ lines up
with the common usage of the term. They use the example of Stephen Hawking as
a prestigious individual in modern-day society (which would line up with our com-
mon sense notions of prestige). However, the common-sense notion of a prestigious
individual does not require that many people are looking to copy their behaviours or
ideas.
In Henrich and Gil-White’s evolutionary story, the most prestigious individuals are
measured by the individuals that most learners are seeking to copy. Even if prestige bias
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in modern-day societies operates differently than in ancestral environments, we would
still minimally expect prestige bias to drive individuals to seek contact or opportunities
for observation with prestigious models, and to be driven to preferentially copy them.
It is therefore unclear whether the key component of prestige is deference from others
and conferring of status onto prestigious individuals, or the seeking of prolonged
access to and opportunities to copy from prestigious individuals from learners. We
may expect these to often come apart.
The lack of a consistent conception or definition of prestige becomes a pressing
issue when assessing the empirical evidence for the existence of prestige bias. In
some lab-based studies prestige is measured by the number of people observing a
model. In a 2012 study by Chudek et al. the ‘prestigious’ model was the one which
was observed by two other individuals, while the other was not. Their measure of
prestige is simply that other individuals are observing the model. Presumably this
measure is chosen because of its relationship to the operation of prestige as described
in the evolutionary origins story of Henrich and Gil-White: the number of people
observing a model (and therefore paying deference benefits for access) was the low-
cost cue that new learners could use. However, this appears to significantly differ from
both common-sense notions of prestige, the identification of prestigious individuals in
studies based in real world networks, and several examples or potential applications
given in theoretical work.
A similar definition of prestige is used in a study by Atkisson et al. (2012), where
participants were tasked to ‘design’ an arrowhead on a computer, with the opportunity
to modify their design based on arrowheads which were presented alongside informa-
tion regarding the ‘prestige’ of the individuals that designed them. Here prestige was
represented by the time that four individuals spent examining the given arrowhead
(generated randomly by the computer), where arrowheads designed by more presti-
gious individuals were examined by others for longer periods of time. In both the
Chudek et al. and Atkisson et al. study, prestige is defined in a way that presupposes
the concept of prestige given in Henrich and Gil-White’s account. To make use of an
analogy, this is as if we are seeking to test the connection between depression and
lower serotonin levels, and in our test we define depression as lower serotonin levels.
We can therefore question the extent to which studies which define prestige in this
way are in fact evidential support for prestige bias.
A study by Acerbi and Tehrani (2018) did use a definition of prestige which is
congruent with our general notion of prestige, in their test of the relative role of
content versus context biases in the selection of quotations. Quotations varied in their
content, and also in their context (either by being associated with a popularity score,
measuring conformist bias, or in the prestige of the individual they were attributed to,
measuring prestige bias). Individuals were then asked to choose their preferred quote.
They measured prestige by attributing quotes to either a famous individual (i.e., one we
would generally consider prestigious), or to an unknown author. However, they did not
find a statistically significant preference for quotes by more prestigious individuals.
Therefore, there appear to be, broadly, two definitions of prestige operating in the
literature. There is the one found in much of the theoretical work, and in studies in
small-scale societies, where prestige typically involves acknowledged success or skill
in a given domain or domains, the payment of deference and of status-related goods.
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This may or may not coincide with other individuals seeking to observe and spend
time with prestigious individuals, and seeking to copy their behaviours. Alternatively,
there is the operative definition of prestige used in lab-based studies, which focuses
around the number of individuals that observe a model. This can occur without any of
the characteristics associated with prestige in the first sense.
3.2 The cognitive basis of prestige bias
In addition to the tension between definitions of prestige which affect our assessment of
the empirical evidence for prestige bias, I will argue that prestige bias as understood by
Henrich and Gil-White is dependent upon a particular understanding of social learning
biases as unconscious or not amenable to reflective consideration.
There are broadly two ways to understand what ‘prestige bias’ refers to. The first is
on a purely populational level, where we see a pattern towards copying the behaviours
of more prestigious people, with no commitment to how this bias is realised on a
cognitive level. The bias could be the product of intelligent reasoning and conscious
thought, it could be implicit and automatic, it could have an affective dimension, or
not. The second way is to place constraints on what this bias entails: for example,
understanding it as a subpersonal, automatic, implicit process (which has implications
for how it operates). Here, I will argue that, while it is tempting to take a populational
view that avoids specific cognitive commitments, the explanatory value of prestige
bias explanations is in part determined by what kind of cognitive processes the bias is
constituted by.
Cecilia Heyes, in her 2018 book Cognitive Gadgets: the Cultural Evolution of
Thinking, outlines two ways to conceptualise the mechanisms that make social learning
selective (i.e. that give rise to biases such as prestige bias): the ‘strategic’ approach and
the ‘attentional’ approach. The strategic approach implies that the selectivity occurs
at the output stage: in the case of prestige bias, if an observer is exposed to two models
performing different actions (one more prestigious than the other), she will encode both
inputs, and then when confronted with a situation where she has to make a decision
about which action to choose, she is more likely to choose the action performed by
the prestigious individual. In this approach, the agent “uses” a strategy, which Heyes
believes implies that this depends on reportable, high-level processes, rather than low-
level, automatic processes. In contrast, the attentional approach asserts that selection
occurs at the point of information reception: if an observer is exposed to two models
performing different actions (one more prestigious than the other), she will attend
more closely to the more prestigious model, and therefore will learn more about this
action than the other. In this case the bias is due to the modulation of learning by
low-level or automatic attentional processes, rather than the application of an explicit
rule.
Heyes argues that those who adopt the strategic approach tend to assume that these
domain-specific, high-order selective social learning bias are genetically inherited,
and see prestige bias as a “cognitive instinct” (Heyes 2018, p. 87). She argues that it
is in fact preferable to understand these kinds of social learning biases as what she
terms ‘cognitive gadgets’, or metacognitive rules or strategies. These metacognitive
123
Synthese
strategies are likely to be culturally rather than genetically inherited, transmitted with
fidelity and accuracy through training and socialisation, and may take highly domain-
specific forms (such as the role ‘copy the boat builder with the largest fleet’). She
claims that, while the attentional approach is plausible for a lot of social learning,
especially in non-human species, the kind of social learning biases that make humans
uniquely capable of cumulative culture involve this kind of metacognition.
If we understand prestige bias as implicit and automatic (or as a domain-general,
attentional process), then the value of a ‘prestige bias’ explanation over a general
‘goal-directed agent’ explanation is evident. Not only do they differ in the cognitive
details (prestige bias is subpersonal, not available to conscious deliberation and rational
reflection), but they would also clearly differ in their predictions. For example, an
individual with general prestige bias would show a tendency to copy the behaviours of
a prestigious individual even in situations where skill did not correlate with prestige,
and where copying the behaviour would not be an effective way of harnessing expertise.
We would expect less flexibility, and less ability for individuals to reflect on and report
on these biases. The differences in the explanatory capacity of these accounts will be
elaborated on in the following section.
However, if we understand prestige bias using the strategic, or metacognitive
approach, things become less clear. To take Heyes’ example of a metacognitive rule,
‘copy the boat builder with the largest fleet’, it is unclear how we would distinguish
cognition and behaviour based on such a ‘rule’, compared to the intervention of general
intelligence. For example, an individual may, upon conscious deliberation, decide that
the copying the boat builder with the largest fleet is what is most likely to enable them
to build the best boat. This may not be the same strategy they follow when building
something else, and this strategy may change depending on circumstances. If this is
the case, then it is not clear what the advantage is of conceptualising these behaviours
as ‘rule’ or ‘strategy’-following. Heyes’ examples include the boat-builder, and ‘copy
digital natives’ (i.e., copy those that we judge to have digital expertise) (2018, p. 82).
We could think of similar rules for any kind of human decision-making, such as ‘copy
the writing style of successful academics’. However, it is unclear that this constitutes
a plausible reflection of human cognition. Heyes gives us no reason to identify cer-
tain behaviours as rule-following, and as examples of culturally evolved ‘cognitive
gadgets’, over others.
Precisely what kinds of cognition underlie these biases matters. It matters because
it will change the predictions of prestige bias explanations, which will either lie in
contrast to or bear more similarities to goal-directed agent type explanations. An
approach that remains agnostic to the cognitive underpinnings loses explanatory value.
Imagine it were the case that we could understand individual behaviours just as well
using a goal-directed agent type approach, understanding decisions through the goals
and limitations of individual agents, but when seen from a populational level, a prestige
bias pattern emerges (we find it is often effective to copy the most prestigious people).
We could term this a prestige bias, but we would then lose what is distinctive from
the existing accounts. We would lose the adaptive explanation for the emergence of
prestige hierarchies, and an explanation for prestige that does not rely on general
intelligence. It would be unclear why we should see prestige bias as an interesting
explanation for behaviour, even if a pattern emerges at the populational level.
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3.3 The context-sensitivity of prestige bias
Following from this, understanding prestige bias as an unconscious or implicit social
learning rule results in certain predictions about how prestige bias operates. These
predictions are crucial to the explanatory value of prestige bias. If prestige bias is
highly context-sensitive and reliant on complex and shifting calculations carried out
by individuals regarding who best to learn from, it becomes increasingly difficult to
separate out its predictions from a goal-directed agent account. Lewens (2015), in his
assessment of conformist bias, highlights the need for conformist bias to not simply
be a tendency to copy the most common traits, but be a tendency for individuals to
disproportionately copy the most common traits in a group. In the case of prestige bias,
learners should be biased towards copying prestigious people over and above what we
would expect from a general account of individuals as goal-directed agents. In an
extreme case, if learners reason that in certain contexts prestige would be a useful
cue, deploy it only when they believe it to be beneficial, and are able to articulate
why they are relying on it in these cases, a prestige bias account would not offer
anything distinctive over a goal-directed account. This would not support Henrich
and Gil-White’s particular evolutionary story, and would call into question why we
should understand population-level patterns of prestige-biased learning, if they exist,
in terms of individuals holding this specific social learning bias, rather than the result
of rational, reflective, goal-directed action.
Therefore, the explanatory value of prestige bias accounts is dependent upon the
extent to which the tendency for learners to copy prestigious individuals is the result
of reflective deliberation or goal-directed intent. One indication of this is the extent
to which prestige bias is cross-domain. By this I mean that when learners copy the
behaviour of prestigious individuals, they copy their behaviour in many respects, not
just a very limited subset of behaviours that are directly responsible for adaptive
outcomes.
The evolution of prestige bias is based on prestige as a low-cost cue for who is best
to copy. In this scenario, it would be too costly (in terms of time, material resources,
or potential for error), or difficult, to directly discern which behaviours are adaptive
and copy these, rather than gaining prolonged access to a model in order to copy many
behaviours. If individuals were able to hone in on the behaviours of successful models
that are responsible for their success, then presumably cooperation of the model in
providing proximity and interaction would play a far smaller role. Additionally, if
learners are copying the adaptive behaviours prestigious individuals only in cases
when it would be adaptive to do so, this behaviour could be explained by a goal-
directed agent account. It would therefore be difficult to see the explanatory gains
from positing prestige bias in particular to explain these phenomena.
At least in modern-day societies, it does not seem to be the case that individuals
copy suites of behaviours and practices from the most prestigious individuals. We
can see this more clearly by looking at some of the examples used. In the prestige
bias literature, we find a mix of informal and formal examples. One often invoked
example is the existence of celebrities. Authors frequently gesture at the ability for
prestige bias to explain why people in modern-day societies have a tendency to copy
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the clothing choices of celebrities, amongst other things (e.g., Henrich 2001; Mesoudi
2009; Jiménez and Mesoudi 2019). However, prestige bias seems to be an ill-fitting
explanation for this phenomenon in two ways. Firstly, many prestigious individuals
are deferred to and given prestige by others who do not wish to copy them. As pre-
viously outlined, Henrich and Gil-White offer the example of Stephen Hawking as a
prestigious individual. However, Stephen Hawking was regarded as ‘prestigious’ by a
large number of people (who may well have paid him deference and other benefits of
prestige), whilst we might imagine that only a very small number of people would be
looking to copy his behaviours or ideas (most broadly, physicists). Secondly, celebri-
ties who are copied are often strikingly not copied in domains that are responsible for
their success. For example, many individuals might copy the style choices of Odell
Beckham Jr., with no intention of trying to copy his American football skills, or the
make-up of Kylie Jenner, without copying her business practices. If prestige bias is
an unconscious or implicit bias towards copying prestigious people where learners
cannot discern which behaviours are responsible for success, we would expect learn-
ers to copy all (or a large set of) the behaviours of a prestigious individual. In our
evolutionary history, if prestige-biased learners selectively copied the non-adaptive
traits of prestigious individuals whilst not copying the adaptive traits, prestige bias
would not have been adaptive and would not have been culturally selected for.
Although it is outside the scope of this paper to defend a particular alternative
explanation here, one possible explanation of the existence of prestigious individuals
who are not generally copied from (such as Stephen Hawking) might be through
a process of rational reflection. For example, individuals might value traits such as
intelligence, and afford respect to those who they perceive as exemplifying these traits.
Additionally, individuals may copy the style of someone like Kylie Jenner due to (in
part) biologically and socially shaped aesthetic preferences. It is difficult to see how
positing prestige bias explains features of the influence of celebrities in a way that
intention-centred explanations cannot.
Additionally, empirical studies have found mixed evidence for the cross-domain
action of prestige bias. Chudek et al. (2012) carried out studies where they claimed
to find evidence of prestige-biased learning in children. In these studies they showed
groups of children (around 4 years old) two adult female ‘models’ performing a series
of actions. Firstly, they were shown the models making a choice between two objects.
One model was being observed by two other individuals, who were not interacting
with the model or each other, only gazing at the model (the ‘prestigious’ model). The
other model was not being observed. Then, they were shown the same two models
making a series of preferences: for example, picking toy A over toy B, or biscuit A
over biscuit B. They were then given the opportunity to make choices between the two
options themselves. They found that children were more likely to copy the choice of
the ‘prestigious’ model, although this was significant for some domains and not others
(in one study, for artifacts, but not for food or drink preferences, and in another, only
for the domain that prestige was cued in).
Studies in small-scale societies have also found differences in the relevance of
prestige in different domains, as well as the connection between prestige and age.
Reyes-Garcia et al. (2008) studied connections between ethnomedicinal plant knowl-
edge and prestige within an Amazonian group called the Tsimane’, and did not find a
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clear association between such plant knowledge and level of prestige, and no associa-
tion between prestige and age. Another study in Fijian villages examined success,
knowledge, and model selection for three socially valued domains: fishing, yam-
growing, and ethnomedicinal plant use (Henrich and Broesch 2011). Success in fishing
and yam-growing were far better predictors of prestige than ethnomedicinal plant
knowledge. Additionally, they only found age to be a predictor of model selection for
some domains in some samples, and individuals were more likely to select models of
the opposite gender to their own. Prestige bias models predict that older individuals are
more likely to be copied and to have prestige, due to an average increase in skill and
knowledge, and that same-gender individuals are more likely to copied (in a society
where what constitutes adaptive behaviours differs between genders).
Brand and Mesoudi (2019) found similar indications that prestige may be domain-
specific. They investigated prestige and dominance hierarchies in groups of adults
who had pre-existing relationships (they were members of established community
groups, rather than participants placed into a new group for the purpose of a study).
In their study, the prestige ratings of an individual given by their group members did
not predict that individual’s performance on the group task they were set, or who was
selected to represent the group for a bonus task. The selection of the group repre-
sentative was based not on perceived prestige or dominance, but correlated with the
individual’s actual performance in the group task.1 The potential domain-specificity
of prestige-biased learning, or who is accorded prestige, matters for the assessment of
prestige bias as an explanation. If prestige-biased learning is highly domain-specific,
this becomes easier to explain in terms of the goal-directedness of agents: individuals
may be evaluating when it is appropriate to rely on prestige cues, and when it is not.
Jiménez and Mesoudi (2019), in their review of the prestige bias literature, note the
mixed evidence for the specific predictions of the Henrich and Gil-White model. Given
this, they suggest modifications to these predictions. These modifications include
restricting the presence of prestige bias to cases where the domain of prestige is
currently valued for a social group, where individuals carry out tasks which are domain-
relevant and difficult, when the variation in knowledge and skill is large, and when
prestige is highly correlated with success. Although these modifications bring the pres-
tige bias account further into agreement with the empirical evidence, they do so at the
expense of explanatory power. If prestige bias is no longer a general ‘rule-of-thumb’,
deployed implicitly and unconsciously, biasing social learning in clear and systematic
ways, but rather a highly context-dependent phenomenon that relies on individuals
having access to large amounts of social information, it becomes more difficult to
make the case that prestige bias offers explanatory benefits that a goal-directed agent
account does not.
However, there is empirical work which does appear to suggest a prestige bias
account over a goal-directed account. Firstly, evidence of overimitation, where people
have a tendency to copy irrelevant actions carried out by prestigious individuals, is sug-
gestive of a systematic bias that is not easily explained through intentional behaviour.
1 Additionally, Jiménez and Mesoudi (preprint) tested the effects of prestige on the transmission of infor-
mation. A prestige bias account would predict that information from more prestigious people would be more
accurately recalled and transmitted. They did not find evidence for the effect of prestige on information
transmission.
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McGuigan (2013) carried out a study in children that showed that they were more
likely to overimitate when copying high social rank models than low social rank mod-
els. However, a study by Chudek et al. (2016) found no difference in the propensity
to overimitate high versus low status models. Secondly, cases where individuals were
not consciously aware of the effect of prestige in deciding who to learn from would
speak in favour of prestige bias, as an unconscious or implicit bias, over a simple
goal-directed account. Priestley and Mesoudi (2015) found that users of the social
media website Reddit ranked ‘social influence’ low on the factors that drove them to
‘upvote’ or ‘downvote’ content. However, as they note, previous work has suggested
that artificially adding ‘upvotes’ (which could be construed as a measure of social influ-
ence) significantly increased the chance of further ‘upvotes’ (Muchnik et al. 2013).
If this is indicative of a broader pattern whereby individuals are not aware they are
acting in a prestige-biased manner, this would support the prestige bias account over a
goal-directed or intention-based explanation. Further work is needed to determine the
extent to which prestige-biased patterns of learning are flexible and context-sensitive,
and individuals are aware of the drivers of their decision-making.
4 Goal-directedness: an alternative explanation
In this section I will make comparison explicit between the prestige bias account
and one proposed alternative, the ‘goal-directed agent account’. I argue that, upon
close examination, it is unclear that the prestige bias model represents an increase in
explanatory power over this naive, or common-sense model.
A goal-directed agent account treats individuals as intentional agents, acting in
pursuit of their goals, where those actions are relative to their epistemic limitations
and the social landscape. This does not necessarily mean that the preferences or choices
of individuals will always be the adaptive optimum; there are many factors that may
circumscribe or shape choices. This could also be characterised as a ‘common-sense’
view of individuals as agents, where individuals’ actions can be understood in terms
of pursuit of their goals. Under this account, individuals would partake in a process
of general evaluation of various relevant factors, that would be flexible and context-
dependent.
The motivation for developing kinds of cultural evolution models frequently stems
from the drive to explain phenomena that seem difficult to explain through a standard
view of humans as goal-directed agents (such as the cassava case outlined by Henrich
2015). If some phenomena could in fact be adequately captured in this way, it would
significantly diminish the explanatory potential of many kinds of cultural evolution
explanations. In the context of a critique of the memetics project, Greenberg (2004)
draws a contrast between memetics explanations and a ‘commonsensical’ account
of cultural change that sees individuals as in “deliberate pursuit of [their] conscious
goals”. He points out that meme theory needs to offer a distinctive explanation of why
ideas spread, which competes with and contributes something beyond a common-
sense goal-based account. A similar situation applies to other cultural evolutionary
approaches. This is an issue because the onus is on cultural evolution approaches to
show their distinctive explanatory value: ‘goal-directed agent’ type explanations are
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so widespread and demonstrably effective in many domains, including our daily lives
and common-sense understanding of others, that it is unclear why we should shift to
a less intuitive framework that downplays human agency, if there is not a clear case
made for its increased explanatory or predictive power.
It is for these reasons that I choose to contrast prestige bias explanations with
‘goal-directed agent’ explanations, to tease our their explanatory potential. This is
not intended as an argument for a simplistic, goal-directed agent explanation as the
best explanation for certain phenomena; other possible competing explanations could
make reference to social or institutional structures, or genetically encoded aspects
of cognition. However, if prestige bias explanations cannot offer anything distinctive
over a common-sense, intuitive, everyday understanding of the behaviour of others, it
would cast their usefulness into doubt.
To illustrate how these explanations would differ, here I elaborate on an example
given by Atkisson et al. (2012) to represent prestige bias. This example is of a woman
who marries into a new community, with different specialisations than the community
she grew up in, and where the women are responsible for making stone arrowheads.
i. Prestige bias explanation
The new prestige-biased learner looks around and determines who the most prestigious
arrowhead maker is in the group (defined by Atkisson et al. as the person that everybody
pays the most attention to). She then pays the cost of access in terms of deference,
and copies the behaviours of this arrowhead maker. If the costs are too high, she may
choose a less prestigious model with lower costs of access.
ii. Goal-directed agent explanation
The new learner considers various factors in pursuit of her goal to make good arrow-
heads. She may consult friends in the group, explore through individual learning, or
try to observe more successful arrowhead makers. If she pays deference to the most
prestigious arrowhead maker, this could be (for example) because of a conscious cal-
culation that deference is necessary in order to obtain the information she would like,
or because she feels admiration for the prestigious arrowhead maker (which could
occur whether or not she copies this individual), or because of the desire to conform
to social norms.
The goal-directed agent model may give the same predictions as the prestige bias
model in some cases, and may depart in others. However, even when the predictions
are the same, the goal-directed agent model cleaves to how we typically understand
individuals’ actions and has high prima facie plausibility, so the onus is on prestige
bias models to provide explanations that improve on this in some way.
4.1 Comparing predictions
The main advantages of prestige bias models, as outlined by Henrich and Gil-White,
appear to be in explaining the existence of prestige hierarchies in human societies
in the first place, and in making predictions that individuals will seek contact with
prestigious individuals, will copy them and pay deference to them, and that prestigious
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individuals will be highly skilled and successful, and be able to maintain their status
without aggression or dominant behaviour.
They may be correct in asserting that a tangible goods theory would struggle to
explain why people show deference even when individuals stop producing tangi-
ble exchangeable goods, why they copy their behaviours and opinions, and why the
dynamics of human social status rankings seem to differ from those of other social
species. However, prestige bias models face similar explanatory challenges. As argued
in the previous section, the explanatory power of prestige bias depends upon, at least
in part, the extent to which it is unconscious, implicit and systematic, rather than flex-
ible, context-sensitive, and amenable to rational deliberation. The empirical evidence
seems to point towards the latter in some respects.
Is it possible to adequately explain the existence of prestige in itself without invoking
prestige bias? Prestige bias models do give a compelling story for why prestige would
have evolved in the first place. However, prestige could be explained through other
means. For example, people generally accord prestige to those they perceive to be
highly skilled or knowledgeable (and, as already argued, not necessarily those they
wish to copy). This could be understood as valuing the skills or knowledge of the other
individual, and translating that into admiration or respect. Additionally, the influence
that prestigious people often have could be understood as others judging them to be
a good source of information or advice based on direct assessment of their skill or
knowledge, rather than a bias to copy based on prestige alone.
A possible response to this is to invoke proximate versus ultimate considerations
here. Could it not be the case that emotions such as admiration are proximate mecha-
nisms by which prestige bias is realised? This is where it becomes important to clarify
what the cognitive basis of this bias is, and whether this matters to prestige bias expla-
nations. However, my intention here is to note that an explanation that does not rely on
an adaptive basis to prestige, and instead (perhaps) understands it as a side-effect of
our general capacities for intelligence and reasoning, is possible and plausible. Here, it
is not clear that a prestige bias account gives us new resources to explain the existence
of prestige.
I consider two studies whose results have been interpreted as evidence for the
existence of prestige bias, in light of both the prestige bias and the goal-directed agent
account. I argue that neither of these studies provide convincing reasons to favour the
prestige bias account over the goal-directed agent account.
4.2 Case 1: building arrowheads
Atkisson et al. (2012) purport to demonstrate prestige-biased learning in adults. In
this study they sat participants at computers and asked them to ‘design’ an arrowhead,
that could vary in several dimensions, and then would be used to go on ‘hunts’. The
closer their design was to the hidden optimal design, the higher their payoff would be.
They had a series of hunts, with an opportunity each time to improve their design either
through individual or social learning. If they chose to learn ‘socially’, they were shown
a choice of five arrowheads, and if they clicked on one, they were given information
about ‘prestige’. This information was the names of four other individuals and the
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amount of time these individuals spent examining the given arrowhead (generated
randomly by the computer). They found that individuals were more likely to select an
arrowhead that was more ‘prestigious’ (those where they were given information that
people had looked at it for longer).
Of course, methodological issues can be found in most studies in any areas. Addi-
tionally, with the necessarily atypical settings of any lab-based study there will always
be questions about external validity. However, the issues that arise with these studies
point to a deeper conceptual confusion in the prestige bias literature. As mentioned
in the previous section, these studies often use proxies for prestige that may not ade-
quately capture the concept as used in theoretical work.
The Atkisson et al. study in particular represents prestige in an unusual way. The
participants do not even have access to individuals to observe, rather they can only
observe the arrowheads produced, and only have information on the length of time
people spent looking at the arrowhead. This is very far from prestige as described in
theoretical work, or as used in daily language. In fact, prestige bias supposedly arose
in part because of the difficulty of gaining useful adaptive information directly from
sources such as artefacts. If this were possible, continued access to prestigious people
would be much less important. Here there is no deference component (there is no
indication that individuals regard the makers of the arrowhead as prestigious, or act as
such), and no opportunity to copy other behaviours other than the arrowhead design
itself. Although this study may point to something interesting about the way in which
we learn, it does not appear to provide evidence for the prestige bias account.
If prestige bias is implicit, and automatic, we would expect it to be cued by signals
such as the way that other individuals act around a prestigious person (i.e. deference).
In the Atkisson et al. study participants had access to information that had to be
interpreted: they would have had to connect the written information that others were
looking at an arrowhead to some internal conception of prestige, where prestige is
not directed towards an identified individual, but is rather routed through the product
of (presumably) someone’s labour (the arrowhead). This seems be consistent with a
deliberative, conscious process of reasoning, where these connections can be made.
It is therefore hard to separate a prestige bias explanation here from a goal-directed
agent explanation, as the influence of conscious and deliberative processes seems clear.
Alternatively, these results could even be construed to support another social learning
bias: conformist bias. The information that others were looking at the arrowhead
could have been interpreted as other individuals also choosing that arrowhead, and
therefore we could tell a story of a bias towards choosing the arrowhead that others
were choosing. There are likely to be issues with this interpretation also, however, I
mention it to point out that the existence of a given social learning bias here is severely
underdetermined by this empirical work.
4.3 Case 2: the evolution of food taboos
Henrich and Henrich (2010) carried out a study which they characterise as a case of
prestige-biased transmission. They aim to show that social learning can give rise to
‘culturally evolved adaptations’, and they do this through examination of a population
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of pregnant women in Fiji. The story they tell is that in Fiji, there are certain marine
species that carry a high risk of toxins that cause food poisoning, with particularly
dangerous effects for foetuses and nursing infants. In the Fijian population, there
exist food taboos for pregnant and breast-feeding women surrounding these particular
species, which cause them to remove those species completely from their diet. Pregnant
and breast-feeding women ‘acquire’ these taboos both from close female relatives and
from a small number of women in the population who are identified as being particular
sources of knowledge on these taboos: ‘yalewa vuku’ or ‘wise women’.
According to Henrich and Henrich, close female relatives are low-cost, accessi-
ble learning models who share fitness incentives with the learner. As defined by the
authors, yalewa vuku are “women who are well-respected and considered knowledge-
able about traditional medicine, birthing and childcare” (p. 3720): these women are
‘preferred models’, and by selectively learning from them, learners can improve on
the cultural variants acquired from their family members. Over time, this tendency
stabilises a population at an adaptive equilibrium. The ‘adaptive’ behaviour of avoid-
ing toxic marine species is explained through patterns of biased transmission, likely
built through rounds of previous genetic and cultural selection.
In order to clarify the explanatory merit of the prestige bias model, I wish to intro-
duce a comparative example. Let us consider the following case:
A woman living in Cambridge becomes pregnant for the first time. As she is con-
cerned for the health of her foetus, she wishes to avoid any behaviours that would
affect its health during her pregnancy. She consults her mother, her family GP,
and the NHS webpage on ‘foods to avoid during pregnancy’. When asked why
she chose these sources of information, she explains that she wants to learn from
the experiences of her mother, who has been through several pregnancies, and
that she places trust in the expertise of her family GP and the recommendations
of the NHS. After consulting these sources, she decides to avoid soft cheeses
with white rinds, such as brie and camembert. This decision is beneficial, as
these cheeses are known to contain listeria bacteria.
This case follows the same structure as the case of Fijian food taboos. Both cases
involve the expression of an ‘adaptive’ behaviour (in that it promotes the health of
the foetus), which is acquired through social learning. The individuals in question
selectively learn from close female relatives and ‘preferred models’.
However, in the second case, a prestige bias model seems intuitively implausible
or unnecessary. This is because a goal-directed agent-type explanation jumps out at
us as being the most plausible and most explanatory. We can explain the Cambridge
woman’s behaviour through standard goal-directed means. She is motivated to max-
imise the health of her foetus, and synthesises information from various sources to
achieve her goal. She chooses these sources based on a variety of reasons, all within
conscious control (i.e., the decisions can be understood without reference to automatic,
subpersonal, or domain-general processes).
Given the similar structure of the Cambridge case to the Fiji case, we can also
apply this goal-directed agent explanation to the Fijian case. The Fijian women under
study are motivated to maximise the health of their foetuses, and therefore consult a
range of sources (family, and known experts) in order to determine the best course of
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action. What this shows is that prestige bias models do not provide any explanatory
advantage over common-sense goal-directed models in this case, with goal-directed
models having higher prima facie plausibility.
These two cases are an indication that the evidence proposed in support of the
existence of prestige bias can likely be equally as well explained by a simple goal-
directed agent model. Therefore, it is difficult to make the case for understanding these
aspects of social learning through this specific prestige bias account, which comes with
theoretical commitments and entails particular assumptions.
5 Implications and conclusion
I have argued here that we have reasons to doubt the plausibility and explanatory
power of a prestige bias account. Differences in the definitions of prestige used in
theoretical and empirical work cast doubt upon the status of the empirical evidence
for prestige bias. Additionally, I have highlighted that prestige bias as an explanation
depends on a particular view of the cognition underpinning the bias. This is associated
with particular predictions about the bias as implicit, systematic, and not available to
conscious reflection. Empirical evidence suggesting prestige-biased learning is flexible
and context-sensitive causes us to question whether we should favour the prestige
bias interpretation over a goal-directed agent explanation. Furthermore, modifying
the predictions of the prestige bias account to bring them in line with the empirical
evidence weakens their explanatory value. I have demonstrated the way in which a
goal-directed agent account could explain some of the empirical evidence for prestige
bias through explicit consideration of two cases, demonstrating that in these cases a
goal-directed explanation may do just as well.
Social learning biases, and prestige bias in particular, form an important component
of work into cultural selection processes. If there are reasons for skepticism about
the existence of prestige bias, what consequences does this have for cultural selection
models in general? I argue that, in fact, this does not have to have a significant negative
impact on the plausibility of at least some cultural selection processes. To take the
example of cultural group selection, prestige bias largely functions as a mechanism for
minimising within-group variation and maintaining between-group variation (Henrich
2004). If individuals are all copying the most prestigious individuals in a group, that
increases the likelihood that most individuals in the group are expressing the same
cultural variant. In this case, as long as there is some mechanism for achieving this,
it does not really matter whether it is prestige bias. For example, people could be
learning in what looks like a prestige-biased pattern, without the existence of implicit,
automatic biases towards prestigious individuals. In fact, everyone could be acting
in a goal-directed way, explicable through a rational agent type explanation, and yet
this still perpetuates enough within-group conformity for cultural group selection to
take place. To return to the medical example outlined above, if everyone believes that
their doctor is an important source of expertise, and doctors share the same opinions
on, for example, what pregnant individuals should avoid, then we may well expect
conformity within a group on tabooed foods during pregnancy.
123
Synthese
However, there are still some important implications for cultural selectionists. Cul-
tural selection explanations depend upon human intelligence or creativity factoring
into these explanations in a limited way. This is not to say that cultural selection
cannot accommodate human intelligence, but rather, that the explanatory power of
cultural selection explanations derives from their ability to give us understanding of
how cultural patterns or traits accumulated and emerged without resorting to human
ingenuity as the locus of explanation. Cultural selection explanations have appeal
when applied to cases that seem unexplainable or poorly explained through intelligent
individual decision-making (Henrich 2015). This is why social learning biases have
formed such a key part of the cultural selection research programme: we can construct
an adaptive story about the emergence of these biases, which then themselves form the
basis for selective processes that rely on automatic, domain-general ‘rules-of-thumb’,
rather than domain-specific, intelligent, individual decisions. If the reason why fitness-
enhancing variants spread is deliberate, conscious, reasoned adoption by individuals,
rather than an automatic, evolved instinct or bias, then we would not expect selection
dynamics to necessarily hold, or selection models to be useful tools.
Future work to further explore the plausibility and value of a prestige bias account
in understanding prestige-biased learning should aim to tease apart and test the pre-
dictions made by prestige bias accounts compared to alternatives.
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